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This article attends to the instrumentalization of gender and 
sexuality in recent Polish political campaigns. Locating current 
political debates in a cultural-historical context of long-established 
hierarchical divides, it conceives of gender and sexuality as ‘empty 
signifiers’ deployed in political struggles (for hegemony) over 
notions of civic responsibility, good citizenship and articulations of 
Europeanness. Similarly, it takes ‘Europeanness’ as an empty 
signifier, without any essential meaning, arguing that these 
signifiers are key to understanding recent mobilizations around 
moral frontiers in Polish politics. Illustrative examples serve to 
elaborate how LGBT rights and sex education are instrumentalized 
among self-proclaimed liberals as well as rightwing nationalists, 
seeking to guarantee the moral integrity of the nation according to 
an antagonistic logic. On both sides of the political divide, we 
witness a self-orientalizing positioning towards the European 
‘core’, whether phrased in terms of sexual modernity or Christian 
civilization.1 
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Oder/Słubice, November 2019. Rafał Smoczynski wishes to acknowledge the Hungarian Bilateral 
State Scholarship he held at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 2020. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This article draws on critical political theory in the tradition of Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe (1985) to highlight the instrumentalization of gender and sexuality 
in recent Polish political campaigns. Our starting point is that political discourses 
do not merely transmit meaning, but produce the meaningful, social world in the 
first place. Moreover, we take as our point of departure that post-1989 Poland is 
characterized by, on the one hand, the disruption or dislocation of old interpretive 
frameworks of civic responsibility, which, after 1989, lost their efficiency in 
interpellating political subjectivities, and, on the other, discursive strategies of 
assessing its actual or imaginary state of maturity according to self-reported 
European values or ideas (Kuus, 2004; 2007; Böröcz, 2006; Melegh, 2006).  
We shall make the case that ‘Europeanness’ represents ideals of civilization 
corresponding to a cultural-historical notion of nobility deeply rooted in Polish 
society. More specifically, we will highlight the impact of an entrenched ‘feudal’ 
lord/boor binary on contemporary struggles for hegemony in the Polish public 
sphere. This framing suggests that it is helpful to consider both local, historical-
cultural specificities and global factors when interrogating how antagonistic 
frontiers originate in dislocated structures (see Nabers, 2017: 421). Illustrative 
examples will serve to highlight how LGBT rights and sex education are 
instrumentalized in political struggles across the political spectrum – among self-
proclaimed liberals and rightwing nationalists alike.  
 
2. Current struggles over civic responsibility 
 
As in other situations of dislocation of sedimented discourses, when old normative 
codes are waning (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Laclau, 1990), the post-communist 
Polish situation called for new civic responsibility frameworks suitable for the new 
circumstances. Amid post-1989 weakened legitimacy of institutionalized social 
control agents, rivalling factions of the Polish intelligentsia struggled for 
hegemony over citizenship models, notably moral disputes about good and bad 
citizen ideals. Two discursive currents dominated the struggle: a conservative 
faction advocating regional protectionism over its resources (political, economic 
and cultural), and a liberal faction advocating ‘European values’.2  
Lacking a stable, positive content that remains unchangeable in relational 
contexts, the category ‘European values’, like ‘Europeanness’, is an empty signifier 
in Laclau’s (2005) terms. Political rivals seek to transform the particularistic 
 
2 Arguably, the Polish political landscape is more complicated than the simple binary ‘conservative’ 
vs. ‘liberal’ suggests. While one liberal formation advocates ‘European values’ in economical and 
cultural terms, another left-wing formation is economically social-democratic and liberal in cultural 
terms. Conversely, while one ‘conservative’ formation is ‘instrumentally pro-European’ (PiS), 
another, emerging one, is anti-European (Konfederacja). We see similar divides within Polish 
feminism to which we shall turn in due course. However, these differentiations do not change our 
assumption that Polish political formations are driven by a culturalist, interpretive framework of 
social reality.  
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signifiers into a dimension of universal meaning that resonates with the wider 
experiences and sensitivities of the public. As indicated above, a set of (empty) 
signifiers related to gender and sexuality have gradually rose to prominence as a 
moral indicator of good and bad citizenship in Poland (and elsewhere). LGBT 
rights and freedoms have fueled political campaigns with various valence, 
strategically deployed in political struggles over notions of civic responsibility, 
citizenship and articulations of Europeanness (Graff, 2006; Hall, 2015).  
Some conservative elites, including the Catholic intelligentsia, have been 
adamantly anti-liberal in matters concerning gender and sexuality, although not 
necessarily stridently anti-gay. As Dorota Hall (2015) observes, ‘Catholic 
intelligentsia’ members have on several occasions expressed their friendliness to 
LGBT people, and the Christian ‘Faith and Rainbow’ group has pledged allegiance 
– or entered a chain of equivalence – with the ‘Catholic intelligentsia’, especially 
associated with the prominent Catholic weekly Tygodnik Powszechny. 
Nevertheless, an antagonistic relationship between religion and homosexuality has 
evolved over time, engaging various discursive components. We shall return to 
these antagonistic articulations in due course, but first we will attend to some key 
cultural-political, historical factors that help explain the evolvement of more recent 
forms of instrumentalization of sexuality in both ‘pro-gay’ and ‘anti-gay’ 
articulations.  
 
3. Polish intelligentsia and divisions between good and bad 
citizens  
 
In Central and Eastern European (CEE) societies, where the bourgeoisie has been 
weakly established and where a high degree of foreign ownership of financial 
assets has dominated (Jedlicki, 1999; Szelenyi, 2006; Hardy, 2007; Nölke and 
Vliegenthart, 2009), a post-gentry intelligentsia stratum – the elite of cultural 
capital – has historically set the parameters of civic responsibility (Gella, 1976; 
Jedlicki, 1999a; Jasiewicz, 2009). Political struggles have thus had less to do with 
class conflict over the distribution of material capital and more to do with tensions 
between different factions of the cultural capital-oriented intelligentsia 
(Smoczynski and Zarycki, 2016; Zarycki, Smoczynski and Warczok, 2017).  
It is beyond the scope of this article to explain the prominent status of Polish 
elites from the late 19th century onwards. Suffice it to say here that the 
intelligentsia’s dominant position is down to a combination of dispossessions 
brought about by the 20th century world wars, the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, and 
the 1944 imposition of the communist regime which gradually wiped out economic 
elites (mainly bourgeois and aristocratic milieus) from the centre of public life. 
These composite factors left the intelligentsia as the major actor in the national 
field of power (Zarycki, Smoczynski and Warczok, 2017; cf. Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1993), accompanied by the communist ‘nomenclatura’ – the elite of 
political capital – which was particularly influential in the early communist period 
(up to the late 1950s) (Eyal et al., 1998). In short, the capitalist elite has not been in 
the position to significantly challenge the dominant role of the intelligentsia for 
16  RANDI GRESSGÅRD AND RAFAŁ SMOCZYNSKI 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 6(3): 13–32.  
the better part of the 20th century in matters concerning civic responsibility 
(Zarycki, 2015), and its impact in the 21st century remains limited (Drahokoupil, 
2009). 
Moreover, and most importantly for our purposes, the Polish intelligentsia 
stratum evolved historically out of the waning landed gentry and their gendered 
notions of civic responsibility. Even though the intelligentsia’s ideological 
imaginary was mostly shaped by late 19th-century ideas of democratic politics 
(mainly socialist and nationalist) (Walicki, 2005), their civic frameworks were 
substantially influenced by the gendered, ‘feudal’ division between good (noble) 
and bad citizens: ‘lord’ versus ‘boor’ (Tazbir, 2013). During the 20th century, the 
masculine ‘lord’ figure gradually lost its association with this pastoral imagery and 
became increasingly informed by modern meritocratic ideals associated with the 
figure of the educated intelligentsia member, although the public remained a 
distinctly masculine coded sphere. The notion of the good citizen was in this 
process re-defined to signify the paternalistic figure who takes responsibility for 
the civic sphere and thereby serves the nation, while ‘boor’ denotes the non-
responsible citizen or non-citizen, historically identified with the landless male 
peasant who did not participate in public life and hence did not take responsibility 
for the Rzeczpospolita (Republic) (Zarycki, 2014). This persistent binary has made 
the Polish citizenship model strongly hierarchical and exclusive (Chałasiński, 
1946), with gender and sexuality distinctions cutting across class divides (see e.g. 
Fidelis, 2010; Grabowska, 2012).  
To grasp the impact of this historical division on post-1989 political 
discourses, it might prove fruitful to draw a structural parallel with the 
Netherlands, where political elites at the turn of the 21st century, in a period of 
rapid social change, sought to recreate a moral civic sphere by discerning between 
good and bad citizens (Schinkel, 2008). In the Dutch case, the informal moral 
differentiation was triggered by a declared crisis of the welfare state and the 
articulation of risks posed by non-Western migrants to social cohesion, national 
security and cultural norms, especially liberal gender and sexuality norms. It was 
argued that some non-Western migrants, Muslims in particular, did not actively 
participate in public life and did not comply with the ideals of secular Dutch 
society, epitomized by gay tolerance (see e.g. Butler, 2008; Graff, 2010; El-Tayeb, 
2011). 
Polish citizenship politics, either in the interwar (1918–1939) period, or 
during the post-communist era, saw similar moralization mechanisms evolve, 
encouraging the public to participate in the civic sphere and comply with the 
ideals of the Republic, embodied by the figure of the intelligentsia member: the 
white, heterosexual male, educated, politically responsible individual (see Zarycki, 
Smoczynski and Warczok, 2017). Although opposite in substance as well as style, 
both the Polish and the Dutch culturalist approach serves to establish a hegemonic 
code of legitimate moral citizenship, and in both cases, the excluded are subjects 
who supposedly fail to comply with the normative ideals – those who do not fulfil 
the culturally defined (inherently gendered and sexualized) boundaries of the 
nation.  
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We have thus far argued that in the post-communist era, boundary-settings 
between ‘lordish’ and ‘boorish’ citizens (and non-citizens) have largely been 
characterized by antagonistic tensions between liberal and conservative factions of 
the intelligentsia. This is not to deny, however, that the ‘entrepreneurial secular 
individual’ who – according to this ideal – is capable of managing various types of 
risks (such as employment risks), achieved a high level of prominence in the 1990s. 
Self-proclaimed ‘real Europeans’ among the post-1989 liberal intelligentsia 
expressed a moral superiority attitude (typical of this stratum) towards ‘not real 
Europeans’ on the basis of possessing entrepreneurial qualities required for a 
successful European integration. Informed by the lord/boor binary, liberal 
intelligentsia members sought to combat cultural forces said to impede European 
integration (Sztompka, 1993), casting various categories of citizens as out of joint 
with the modern world (Horolets, 2006; Koczanowicz, 2011). This was particularly 
the case in political campaigns against the ‘homo sovieticus’ figure coined in the 
early 1990s public discourse (Zarycki, 2004). The ‘homo sovieticus’ figure 
,commonly juxtaposed with the entrepreneurial urban-based individual, was 
allegedly failing to adapt because of its lacking self-management skills. A 
corresponding opposition is the one between educated and the poorly educated, 
the latter presumably incapable of taking advantage of socio-economic 
transformations. Related polar oppositions include open-minded versus closed-
minded, secular versus religious, and rational versus superstitious (Buchowski, 
2006: 466).  
Techniques of moral regulation, which are vivid in the above-depicted 
dichotomies, are crucial to the formation of prudent citizenship (Corrigan and 
Sayer, 1985; Hunt, 1997; 1999; Valverde, 1994; 1995), and as feminist and queer 
scholars have demonstrated, formations of nation – notions of proper citizens – 
are inextricably linked to formations of gender and sexuality (see e.g. Mosse, 1985; 
Parker et al., 1992; McClintock, 1995; Yuval-Davis, 1997; Pryke, 1998; Nagel, 2003; 
Kulpa, 2011). For instance, Sam Pryke (1998: 541) points to two principal ways in 
which sexuality has figured within nation building: through attempts to delimit 
what is normatively acceptable sexual behaviour on the part of a national citizen, 
and through controlling fertility. Both mechanisms are central to nationalist 
politics in Poland, but even liberals have advocated regulations of gender and 
sexuality, albeit in more indirect ways (through governmental regulations rather 
than disciplinary control) and with slightly different aims. It should be noted that 
Polish liberal elites have until recently wielded a relatively conservative gender 
and sexuality agenda compared with their ‘Western’ counterparts. In line with 
liberal formations elsewhere, however, their strategy has predominantly been to 
address ‘prudent individuals’ capable of managing risks and avoiding harm 
through governmental techniques of responsibilization. As Hunt (2003) and others 
(see e.g. O’Malley, 1996) point out, the strategy of identifying prudent citizens has 
achieved a dominant regulatory position in everyday life.  
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4. Moralization of citizenship and self-orientalization 
 
Once implemented in the post-communist CEE region, the regulatory discursive 
machinery generated its own interepellating efficiency, usually within the self-
orientalizing register of ‘nesting orientalism’, that is, the extension of the symbolic 
topography of the original Orient to other places and people, implying a gradation 
of Orients: Asia is cast as more East or Other than Central and Eastern Europe, and 
the Balkans and Russia are designated as the most Eastern within Eastern Europe 
(Bakić-Hayden, 1995: 918; Zarycki, 2015). In Poland, the prudent citizenry has in 
various historical contexts been perceived as torn between the empires of the 
rational, civilized West and the barbarian, alien East (most commonly linked to 
Russia in its different political forms), the latter being variably associated with 
nationalism, authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, and suppression of 
women and sexual minorities. Although this East/West antagonism could be traced 
back to exponents of the Polish Enlightenment, we shall concentrate on the post-
1989 discursive dynamics between the European ‘core’ and the eastern 
‘peripheries’.  
It bears noting in this context that over the last three decades, there has been 
a strong asymmetry between pro-European elite discourses (associated with the 
liberal intelligentsia) and Euro-sceptical ones (associated with nationalism) in their 
capacity to shape formal and informal hierarchies of citizenship. Political 
hegemony has unequivocally belonged to the elite factions, which have presented 
their ideological stand in line with the self-reported dominant neoliberal 
compromise reigning in ‘core’ European countries. Put differently, the political 
elites have enjoyed the hegemonic position of being able to articulate an 
undisputable universal model of good citizenship that ought to be implemented in 
the ‘semi-peripheral’ CEE countries. This asymmetry did not change significantly 
until the 2008 ‘economic crisis’, when the neoliberal compromise started to unravel 
globally, followed by the so-called European migration crisis of 2015. The two 
moments of articulated ‘crisis’ paved the way for the rightwing Law and Justice 
(PiS) party, whose victory in the parliamentary elections in 2015 meant that the 
cultural hierarchy between Euro-enthusiastic and nationalist or protectionist 
discourses gradually crumbled. This displacement surely weakened the neoliberal 
ideological agency in its capacity to address Polish political subjectivities, but it 
also gave rise to a more moralized and polarized debate revolving around gender 
and sexuality.  
Before illuminating some of these moral-political tensions, it should also be 
noted that Euro-scepticism does not amount to a full-blown anti-EU ideology. 
Given Poland’s fragile geopolitical location, EU membership is widely regarded 
(either instrumentally or idealistically) as a national security assurance in the face 
of Russian revisionist policies. Hence, the major Polish nationalist formations, 
most notably the PiS party, do not want Poland to leave the EU. They target 
instead what they consider as undesirable foreign influence. As we shall see in the 
following, PiS strategically portrays homosexuality as a ‘foreign invasion’ and do 
not shy away from invoking anti-Semitic tropes, such as ‘the homosexual lobby’ 
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seeking to undermine ‘the family’ according to a carefully prepared plan (Graff, 
2010: 594). Apparently, ‘the corrupt European body’ is embodied in the 
Europeanized gay person (Graff, 2006: 448; cf. Lewicki, 2016; Keinz and Lewicki, 
2019).  
From a critical political theory point of view, we could argue that the 
articulation of corruption of the social is made possible by reference to some 
mythical purity that is lost (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Laclau, 1990). In a 
comparable manner, Dirk Naber (2017: 425) shows how the ‘nation’ functions as an 
empty signifier in the US ‘war on terror’ in a sedimented discourse of American 
exceptionalism: ‘a deliberate attempt to suture a dislocated identity by drawing on 
previously established sedimented practices’. Antagonism is crucial in this process: 
opposed elements are articulated as conflicting and are excluded from the alleged 
fullness of the mythical national community, the national imaginary. The 
subsequent institutionalization of this imaginary – which excludes alternative 
frames of intelligibility – is experienced as a solution to the crisis threatening the 
national identity, that is, a recovery of something that has been there all along: a 
lost origin, identity or ‘core’ (Naber, 2017: 422).   
 
5. The politicization of homophobia and ‘gender ideology’  
 
Agnieszka Graff (2010: 585) notes that after Poland’s EU accession, rightwing 
nationalist forces increasingly portrayed Europe as morally corrupt, juxtaposing 
‘European perversion’ with ‘healthy Polish traditionalism’ capable of resisting the 
pressure to conform to EU-imposed standards (see also Graff, 2006). Because EU 
resolutions are meant as responses to state-sanctioned discrimination against 
sexual minorities, Graff continues, so-called homophobes can score political points 
by non-compliance, and homophobia can function as a sign or discourse of 
patriotism and national sovereignty (Graff, 2010: 590–591, 600–601; cf. O’Dwyer 
and Schwartz, 2010). This is of course the reverse of the Dutch case, where ‘homo 
tolerance’ – in accordance with official EU policy – serves as an index of 
democracy and civilizational development. In both cases, though, sexual 
boundaries are assumed to coincide with national ones, underpinned by the same 
gendered, culturalist binaries (Graff, 2010: 584, 601; cf. Kulpa, 2011; 2014; Bilić, 
2016).  
The privileged position of the Catholic Church in Polish public life has 
arguably played an important role in the post-communist politicization of 
homophobia. Church leaders’ ‘family first’ rhetoric resonates with nationalist 
sentiments and gives legitimacy to the rising tide of homophobic hatred and 
hostile environments for sexual minorities. The ‘family first’ refrain became 
particularly prevalent in March 2019, after Warsaw’s newly elected liberal mayor, 
Rafał Trzaskowski, proposed a series of commitments towards LGBT people, 
including anti-discrimination measures and sex education in schools. In response, 
the leader of Poland’s ruling PiS party, Jarosław Kaczyński, warned against same-
sex marriage and ‘sexualization’ of young people at a gathering in the city of 
Włocławek. By way of moral protection, he took aim at so-called risk-related sex 
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education, LGBT rights and gender theory, claiming that these ‘ideologies’ pose a 
threat to the traditional Polish way of life: ‘These ideologies, philosophies, all of 
this is imported, these are not internal Polish mechanisms […]. They are a threat to 
Polish identity, to our nation, to its existence and thus to the Polish state’.3  
Homosexuality is not only alien to Polish traditions, according to this script, 
but poses a threat to the Western civilization itself. To combat the alleged menace 
posed by foreign-hearted enemies, it is imperative – so the dominant claim goes – 
to reassert ‘authentic’ national and European traditions of which political and 
religious leaders claim exclusive ownership. According to a study by Justyna Kajta 
(2017) on nationalist discursive strategies, there is a growing tendency to depict 
homosexuals as enemies according to a slippery-slope logic: it is believed that gay 
marriage would eventually lead to pedophiles’ beginning to organize, which 
ultimately would result in a national and civilizational crisis.  
Given the messianic tendencies embedded in Polish society, it does not come 
as a surprise that Catholic/rightwing articulations elevate Poland as ‘the last 
bastion of Christian civilization’ (Kajta, 2017: 100) which should be protected or 
saved by dint of cultural self-defense and, in turn, could help protect or save 
Europe from itself (cf. Mizielińska, 2011: 87–88; Korolczuk and Graff, 2018: 806, 
812; Jarkovská, 2020). As Srdjan Sremac and Roard Ganzevoort (2015: 8) point out 
in their discussion of religion and homosexuality in the CEE region, the sacred 
social order is fundamentally antagonistic towards the constructed enemies, and 
the authority of their ethno-national and religious powers thrives on the principle 
of exclusion and their exhibited will to ‘moral defense’ (by mobilizing moral 
panic). We may infer from this that the postulation of Polish exceptionalism 
concurs with exclusions of sexual minorities through phantasmatic articulations of 
evil forces, thus consolidating ‘noble’ Polish sexuality as a norm underpinning the 
sacred moral order of nationhood, which in turn epitomizes (lost) ‘original’ or 
‘authentic’ European values. 
 
6. Rightwing, anti-LGBT election campaigns 
 
In the political campaign leading up to the European parliamentary elections in 
May 2019, we saw an unprecedented coordinated effort to create sexualized 
antagonisms and a sense of social and civilizational crisis in Poland. Leading ruling 
party members and the media associated with PiS strategically interlinked 
homosexuals and pedophile rings menacing children’s well-being, all the while 
referencing Catholic doctrine on marriage and the family. In a sermon to mark the 
75th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising, the archbishop of Kraków, Marek 
Jędraszewski, warned about a ‘rainbow plague’, comparing gay rights to Nazism 
and Soviet communism.4 This message dovetails with how senior member of the 
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Ahead of the national elections in October 2019, PiS intensified its 
homophobic rhetoric, claiming that ‘LGBT ideology’ or ‘gender ideology’ is an 
‘invasion’ and that gay people are ‘foreign agents’ or ‘traitors’ against which the 
national community – symbolized by innocent children and the traditional family 
– must be protected. The run-up to the parliamentary elections also inspired 
physical homophobic violence, such as the brutal attacks by far-right groups on 
participants of the so-called Equality March in the city of Białystok in north-
eastern Poland in July 2019.5  
Following this line of events, regional PiS officials pushed to declare cities 
and entire provinces in Poland’s conservative southeast ‘LGBT ideology free 
zones’. For instance, the council of Lublin designated the city as an LGBT-free zone 
to signal that LGBT and other gender non-conforming citizens do not fit into 
Polish society, thereby marking them as alien. Another example of LGBT ostracism 
is the declaration by mayor of Kalwaria Zebrzydowska, Augustyn Ormanty, of the 
town as a LGBT-free zone and his attempt to adopt a resolution stating that gay 
ideology is annihilating Christian values. (The resolution was rejected by the 
council in favor of a milder one pledging to protect the ‘traditional family’.)6 Such 
designations and resolutions, though legally dubious, are instances of symbolic 
violence serving to aggravate anti-LGBT moral panics nation-wide.7  
Against this background, we see that by incorporating religious elements 
into the ethnonational ideological matrix, LGBT rights and freedoms can readily be 
made to appear as detrimental to the integrity of family, tradition, nation and 
Western civilization alike (Sremac and Ganzevoort, 2015: 2). When the proscribed 
term ‘LGBT ideology’ is paired with the juggernaut ‘gender ideology’,8 politicized 
homophobia becomes part of the wider incursive strategy of ‘anti-genderism’, with 
the potential to galvanize a large number of conservatives around destabilization 
of ‘natural’ gender roles and patriarchal structures. These crisis narratives are 
often informed by anxieties about depopulation (playing into ‘the great 
replacement’ conspiracy theory) and the ultimate destruction of culture and 
humanity (Korolczuk and Graff, 2018: 803). Elżbieta Korolczuk and Agnieszka 
Graff (2018: 805) comment: ‘today the interests of the Vatican, US Christian 
fundamentalists, and European nationalists appear eerily convergent with those of 
Putin’s Russia, which is perceived as a moral rejuvenator of the West.’ The 
different actors are symbolically united by a yearning for universalism, which 
necessitates the defense of ‘original’ universal Western values represented by a 
(white) Christian civilization (ibid., 806, 807). The road to universal European 
values is, in other words, paved with nationalist, anti-elitist struggles for gender 





battle-polands-soul Accessed 05-10-2019. 
7 By the end of 2020, over 100 cities and regions had declared themselves ‘LGBT-free zones’.  
8 ‘Gender ideology’ is an abbreviated shorthand for a variety of practices and freedoms associated 
with LGBT, queer and feminism. In some religious objections, Judith Butler (2019: 10) notes, 
‘“gender” simply is the same as, or a cover for, homosexuality’. 
22  RANDI GRESSGÅRD AND RAFAŁ SMOCZYNSKI 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 6(3): 13–32.  
At the same time, anti-LGBT articulations have triggered counter-discourses 
and mobilized people against homophobia, such as the ‘LGBT welcome’ actions by 
Lublin-based restaurants and other institutions. What interests us most in this 
context, however, is the antagonistic ways in which PiS opponents and pundits, 
home and abroad, have condemned what they see as an increasingly anti-
liberalization of Poland, accusing the government for exaggerating the dark sides 
of European liberalism and discrediting liberal principles and institutions – to 
which we shall turn next. 
 
7. Liberal anti-populist rhetoric 
 
Under PiS, it is often argued, Poland has emerged as an opponent of the EU’s 
liberal-democratic values, culminating in the declarations of LGBT-free zones and 
the homophobic violence in Białystok.9 Describing the attacks on the Equality 
March from a first-hand perspective for the British newspaper, the Guardian, 
author and columnist Jacek Dehnel vividly writes: 
 
Now and then, a lorry drives along the march with a megaphone, spitting 
out Catholic propaganda about how gays and lesbians rape children by the 
dozen. […] We march doggedly, through a series of blockades, and it seems 
as if we are marching through the darkest valley, a lions’ den, though these 
are definitely less noble animals.10  
  
Although the described acts of violence are disgraceful, the column is not without 
its own symbolic violence in its invocation of the Polish nobility imaginary. This is 
not to say that the two political sides are equally violent, because that would be to 
construct a false moral equivalence between them and tap into rightwing ‘what-
about-ism’.11 But given the long-established lord/boor divide, the designation ‘less 
noble animals’ (in the quote) is firmly rooted in the intelligentsia-informed 
symbolic framework underpinning and animating Polish public debate, and the 
transmission of meaning through such discursive framing speaks to political 
 
9 In September 2020, the head of the European commission, Ursula von der Leyen, said that Poland’s 
‘LGBT-free zones’ are ‘humanity-free zones’ that have no place in the EU. See 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/16/ursula-von-der-leyen-says-polands-lgbt-free-zones-
have-no-place-in-eu A few months earlier, the Dutch town Nieuwegein ended its longstanding ties 
with Puławy in eastern Poland after the latter municipality had declared itself a LGBT-free zone. 
Following the decision to ‘unfriend’ the Polish municipality and terminate all contact, stickers with a 
rainbow flag were – in a symbolically laden gesture – placed on one of the town’s entrance signs to 




11 An examplary example of ‘what-about-ism’ or ‘two-side-ism’ is Donald Trump’s infamous 
comment ‘there were very fine people on both sides’, uttered after the clash between fascists and 
antifascist at a rally in the Virginian city Charlottesville in 2017, where a white nationalist 
(suprematist) drove his car into the crowd and injured a civil rights activist who died shorlty after the 
attack.  
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subjectivities in ways that risk exacerbating existing political divides and the sense 
of crisis of democracy and (sexual) freedom.12 As Jason Glynos and Aurelien 
Mondon (2016) argue, the tendency to present an overly simplistic picture of one’s 
opponents is not confined to populist discourses but can also be found in liberal 
responses to rightwing populism. One dimension of the ‘hyped’, anti-populist 
response is the use of disaster rhetoric to convey a sense of existential threat to 
‘European values’ and ‘democratic ideals’ posed by ‘irrational and irresponsible 
(populist) voters’ (ibid, 7–10).  
 In Poland, many in the liberal camp viewed the 2015 PiS parliamentary 
victory as a triumph of the political pariah, purportedly opening up for an inflow 
of plebeian aspirations in public space and giving rise to unacceptable political 
articulations in terms of ‘nationalism’, ‘homophobia’, ‘anti-democracy’ etc. 
Instructive here is liberal reactions to the PiS party’s leading welfare policies, the 
so-called 500+ program, which provides parents with a monthly welfare subsidy 
per child.13 One of the most striking results of the program is a growing domestic 
tourism: families visiting Poland’s seaside resorts, a phenomenon frequently 
ridiculed by the liberal intelligentsia. For instance, Anna Szulc expressed her 
aversion for the ‘boor’ tourists in a 2016 Newsweek Weekly article in which she 
describes the invasion of 500+ Barbarians (Inwazja Hunów) on the Polish coast.14 
Much like anti-Brexiteers in Britain, social media users and newspaper columnists 
in the Polish liberal camp have resorted to classism and ageism when fingering 
majority constituencies as rural, uneducated, elderly peasants from 
underdeveloped regions. Symptomatic of this deriding form of social commentary 
is a 2017 Facebook post by Krzysztof Łoziński, who at the time served as leader of 
the civic movement KOD (Committee for the Defense of Democracy):  
 
Everything that is taking place now should be understood as an 
ennoblement of the boor, these are boors in the courtyard. Once the time 
comes and PiS loses its power, the biggest problem will be removing the 
halo from the boor’s head. The boor is being elevated on monuments. The 
boor wields power.15 
 
In this quote, ‘ennoblement of the boor’ is clearly a derogative term used to 
delegitimize PiS voters and simultaneously raise warnings about their affront to 
liberal rights and freedoms. The storyline figure of the irrational voter, Glynos and 
Mondon (2016: 10) note, energizes narratives about threats to European liberal 
democracies. Another top-ranked KOD activist, Walter Chełstowski, went even 
 
12 The fact that the story is published in the British newspaper, the Guardian, suggests that its readers 
are mainly liberal-minded (in moral quesitons), well-educated European cultural ‘elites’. 
13 At its start, the program did not cover the first child, but was later extended to cover every child, 




15 See https://studioopinii.pl/archiwa/184061 
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further, expressing his disillusion with the equal right to vote (suffrage) when 
commentating on the elections results on his Facebook page:  
 
This is a result of equality policies towards the foolish and independent 
thinkers that are being practiced in the free democratic elections in many 
countries. The vote of the boor, simple-minded, the foolish and poorly 
educated, counts exactly as much as the vote of all others among us.16 
 
Incoherent as they may seem as far as the enshrinement of liberal rights and 
freedoms is concerned, these anti-populist statements express and provoke feelings 
that clearly tap into symbolic registers rooted in the lord/boor distinction: ‘we’ are 
civilized and morally responsible citizens, whereas ‘they’ are unruly and 
irresponsible. As with nationalist-populist discourse, liberal anti-populist 
articulations of threatened identities draw on sedimented practices, predicated on 
mythical ideas of the pure but lost origin – the moral (dis)integrity of society (cf. 
Nabers, 2012: 422–424). Moreover, these attempts to articulate a cultural and moral 
crisis within a civilizational frame are enmeshed in the East/West dynamic of 
(self)colonialization. It could be argued that efforts – home and abroad – to shame 
Poland (or the CEE region more broadly) as backward and parochial, while 
construing the West as essentially progressive, do not merely belie the more 
complex realities, but inevitably reinsert the colonial-imperial moral and cultural 
superiority of ‘core’ Europe (Sremac and Ganzevoort, 2015: 2; cf. Kulpa, 2014). We 
have seen that LGBT rights-related signifiers, customarily used in shaming 
practices to exert political leverage, are readily available in anti-populist liberal 
politics insofar as they symbolize civilizational Europeanness (cf. Gressgård, 2015). 
We shall now turn to the equally divisive struggles over sex education.  
 
8. Modernization and struggles over sex education  
 
If we look at how sex education in schools was politicized in the 2019 European 
parliamentary election debates in Poland, a similar antagonistic pattern appears. A 
chain of equivalence was articulated, on both sides of the political divide, between 
various sexuality-related practices to establish a national imaginary. By drawing 
on sedimented practices, both liberals and nationalists sought to guarantee the 
moral integrity of the nation according to the crisis logic described by Naber (2016: 
427): ‘The articulation of binaries, the depiction of an ‘evil’ Other, and antagonism 
are […] significant for the establishment of hegemonic relations in times of crisis’.  
A case in point is the February 2019 decision of the President of Warsaw, 
Rafał Trzaskowski, to sign a LGBT+ declaration identifying areas in need of policy 
intervention (following World Health Organization (WHO) standards), including 
anti-discrimination and anti-violence education in schools, the establishment of a 
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The declaration was indubitably a deliberate move in the ongoing European 
Parliament election campaign, calculated to polarize public opinion, and as one 
would expect, rightwing activists swiftly mobilized against it. For instance, PiS 
president, Jarosław Kaczyński, stated: ‘Polish parents have the right to raise their 
own children, we will defend the Polish family. It’s hard to call it education; this is 
not education; it is social engineering aiming to change a person. What’s in the 
centre of it? It is the very early sexualization of children.’17  
When the debate took off, liberals seized the opportunity to portray 
conservatives as enemies of modernization, morally backward and sexually 
repressed, orbiting towards non-rational arrangements owing to their religious, 
superstitious inclinations. The inclusion of sex education in the national 
curriculum and the implementation of sexual minority rights into the legal 
framework are, as they see it, necessary steps towards deeper integration with the 
secular, liberal-democratic West. Accordingly, they promote a rational and non-
sectarian approach to sexuality which allegedly invests minors with the 
competence required to avoid risk-based sexual conduct. In the liberal 
intelligentsia optic, inhibiting minors from receiving sex education amounts to 
blocking their opportunities for gender and sexuality empowerment, hence putting 
them at risk. Once again, we see how gender and sexuality issues serve as political 
instruments for building a new, more liberal citizenship model (cf. Dzenovska, 
2018; see also Gressgård, 2015). For the conservative/nationalist faction, on the 
other hand, universalization of their ideological stand entails strategies of social 
control in the name of ‘child protection’. Mirroring the widespread Euro-Atlantic 
anxieties over children’s safety, they symbolically link LGBT rights and freedoms 
to abuse of minors, while conflating sex education in schools with premature 
exposure to sex and linking it to risky sexual behavior. In both cases, an equivalent 
relationship is established between risk-oriented signifiers, and on both sides of 
the political divide, the hegemonic discourses purport to overcome a politically 
articulated crisis. 
At this juncture, we may ask where – in this polarized debate – Polish 
feminist movements are positioned. Around the turn of the century, Graff (2019: 
474) explains, contemporary Polish feminism was divided along two main strands, 
one radical left-wing and another mainstream liberal. Both were distinctly anti-
populist-cum-nationalist, but while the former resolutely rejected national 
symbols, the latter had a more affirmative (patriotic) relationship to the national 
heritage (ibid., 475; cf. Grabowska, 2012). This symbolic logic changed, however, 
with the Black Protest in 2016, which brought hundreds of thousands of people 
into the streets and involved symbolic activity on an unprecedented scale. Graff 
highlights how the protest complicates the neat divide between anti-nationalists 
and patriots, making it impossible to stabilize the meaning of symbols along 
established lines. She concludes that ‘the Black Protest mobilization was a 
breakthrough for Polish feminism, bringing joy, hope, and enthusiasm, but also 
chaos and unpredictability’ (Graff, 1019: 492–493).  
 
17 See https://polandin.com/41692741/lgbt-warsaw-declaration-stirs-emotions-in-polish-politics 
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9. Concluding remarks 
 
In our discussion of current struggles over moral gender and sexuality issues in 
Polish political debates, we have demonstrated that it is helpful to take into 
consideration the historical emergence of Polish cultural elites and its relationship 
to the empty signifier ‘Europeanness’ or ‘European values’. Given the prevalent 
role of cultural capital in Polish public life, it does not come as a surprise that 
rightwing nationalists-cum-populists take criticism of their policies as attacks on 
‘sacred’ resources, whereas the Euro-enthusiastic camp takes EU integration as a 
modernization process (including sexual modernization): a movement away from 
‘Eastern superstition’ towards ‘Western rationality’ (Zarycki, 2014). For self-
proclaimed nationalists, moral panics pertaining to gender and sexuality serve to 
justify moral responsibilization techniques in the name of ‘defense’, while also 
giving a mythic explanation for why desired family values are deprived of their 
social fullness. Nationalist campaigners seek to expose European corruptness that 
must be blocked by ‘good citizens’ representing – and yearning for – the genuine, 
non-corrupted European universal civilization. Their liberal counterparts, on the 
other hand, make claims to ‘European values’ through a civilizational discourse of 
modernization. On both sides of the political divide, whether phrased in terms of 
sexual modernity or Christian civilization, we see a self-orientalizing positioning 
towards (the empty signifier) ‘European values’.  
Considering the largely unchallenged position of the intelligentsia in Polish 
society and the prominence of gender and sexuality signifiers in political conflicts 
over normative citizenship models, it is likely that polarized struggles over ‘the 
European body’ will continue to dominate political debates in the medium-run 
perspective. But in keeping with Graff’s cautiously optimistic view, which suggests 
that entrenched cultural imaginaries might be less stable when looking at the more 
complex realities beyond the vantage point of key enunciators (politicians, political 
commentators, etc., with voluminous media exposure) (Glynos and Mondon, 2016: 
3, 6), we want to end on a theoretical note that reminds us of the contingency – 
and instability – of these polarized factions: while efforts to re-suture a dislocated 
structure is necessary for the constitution of society, it is also its condition of 
impossibility (Laclau, 1996).  
If we recognize that indeterminacy is the constitutive feature of society, 
antagonism is not reducible to concrete political conflicts, but is better understood 
as constitutive of political conflicts and, more generally, of the social world’s 
pluralistic nature (Mouffe, 2005: 17). So, while every social order is predicated on 
the exclusion of other possibilities through antagonism, any moment of 
antagonization is also a moment of undecidability, pointing to the contingency of 
every order. Put in slightly different terms, if antagonistic politics serves as a 
(symbolic) reminder of the ungroundable nature of society (Marchart, 2007; 
Gressgård, 2011; Glynos and Mondon, 2016), it also tells us that polarized debates 
are moments of political volatility and great social stress. And, as Gayle Rubin 
(1984: 267) highlights, conflicts over sexual values and erotic conduct acquire 
immense symbolic weight and should be treated with special respect in such times.  
NOBLE POLISH SEXUALITY AND THE CORRUPTED EUROPEAN BODY 27 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 6(3): 13–32.  
References 
 
Bakić-Hayden, M. (1995) Nesting orientalism: the case of former Yugoslavia. Slavic 
Review, 54(4): 917–931. https://doi.org/10.2307/2501399 
Bilić, B. (2016) Europeanisation, LGBT activism, and non-heneronormativity in the 
post Yugoslav space. In Bilić, B. (ed.) LGBT Activism and Europeanization in 
Post-Yugoslav Space. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 1–22. 
Böröcz, J. (2006) Goodness is elsewhere: The rule of European difference. 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 48(1): 110–138. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417506000053 
Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L. J. D. (1993). From ruling class to field of power: An 
interview with Pierre Bourdieu on La noblesse d’Etat. Theory, Culture & 
Society, 10(3): 19–44. 
Buchowski, M. (2006) The spectre of Orientalism in Europe: From exotic other to 
stigmatized brother. Anthropological Quarterly, 79(3): 463–482. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/anq.2006.0032 
Butler, J. (2008) Sexual politics, torture, and secular time. British Journal of 
Sociology, 59(1): 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2007.00176.x 
Butler, J. (2019) Gender in translation: Beyond monolingualism. PhiloSOPHIA, 9(1): 
1–25. https://doi.org/10.1353/phi.2019.0011 
Chałasiński, J. (1946) Społeczna genealogia inteligencji polskiej (Social Genealogy of 
the Polish Intelligentsia). Warsaw: Czytelnik. 
Corrigan, P. and Sayer, D. (1985) The Great Arch. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Dzenovska, D. (2018) School of Europeanness: Tolerance and Oher Lessons in Political 
Liberalism in Latvia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Drahokoupil, J. (2009) Globalization and the State in Central and Eastern Europe: The 
Politics of Foreign Direct Investment. London: Routledge. 
El-Tayeb, F. (2011) European Others: Queering Ethnicity in Postnational Europe. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Eyal, G., Szelenyi, I. and Townsley, E. R. (1998) Making Capitalism without 
Capitalists: Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-communist Central 
Europe. London: Verso. 
Fidelis, M. (2010) Women, Communism, and Industrializationin in Postwar Poland. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gella, A. (1976) An introduction to the sociology of the intelligentsia. In Gella, A. 
(ed.) The Intelligentsia and the Intellectuals: Theory, Method, and Case Study. 
London: Sage. 9–34. 
28  RANDI GRESSGÅRD AND RAFAŁ SMOCZYNSKI 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 6(3): 13–32.  
Glynos, J. and Mondon, A. (2016) The political logic of populist hype: The case of 
right-wing populism’s ‘meteoric rise’ and its relation to the status quo. 
POPULISMUS Working Papers, No. 4. Thessaloniki: Populismus. 1–20. 
Grabowska, M. (2012) Bringing the second word in: conservative revolutions(s), 
socialist legacies, and transnational silences in the trajectories of Polish 
feminism. Signs, 37(2): 385–411. https://doi.org/10.1086/661728 
Graff, A. (2006) We are (not all) homophobes: A report from Poland. Feminist 
Studies, 32(2): 434–449. https://doi.org/10.2307/20459096  
Graff, A. (2010) Looking at pictures of gay men: Political uses of homophobia in 
contemporary Poland. Public Culture, 22(3): 583–603. 
https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-2010-010 
Graff, A. (2019) Claiming the shipyard, the cowboy hat, and the anchor for women: 
Polish feminism’s dialogue and struggle with national symbolism. East 
European Politics and Societies and Cultures, 33(2): 472–496. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325419835914  
Gressgård, R. (2011) Revisiting contingency, hegemony and universality. In 
Dhawan, N., Engel, A. and Varela, M. D. (eds.) Hegemony and 
Heteronormativity: Revisiting ‘the Political’ in Queer Politics. Farnham: 
Ashgate. 25–41. 
Gressgård, R. (2015) The instrumentalization of sexual diversity in a civilizational 
frame of cosmopolitanism and tolerance. In Dhawan, N., Engel, A., Holzhey, 
C. F. E. and Woltersdorff, V. (eds.) Global Justice and Desire: Queering 
Economy. London: Routledge. 99–114. 
Hall, D. (2015) Antagonism in the making: Religion and homosexuality in post-
communist Poland. In Sremac, S. and Ganzevoort, R. R. (eds.) Religious and 
Sexual Nationalisms in Central and Eastern Europe: Gods, Gays and 
Governments. Leiden: Brill. 74–92. 
Hardy, J. (2007) The new competition and the new economy: Poland in the 
international division of labour. Europe-Asia Studies, 59(5): 761–777. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130701377359 
Horolets, A. (2006) Discursive means of pulling Europe closer in Polish press. In 
Kutter, A. and Trappmann, V. (eds.) The Legacy of Accession: Europeization in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 65–78. 
Hunt, A. (1997) Moral regulation and making up the new person: Putting Gramsci 
to work. Theoretical Criminology, 1(3): 275–301. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1362480697001003001 
Hunt, A. (1999) Governing Morals: A Social History of Moral Regulation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
NOBLE POLISH SEXUALITY AND THE CORRUPTED EUROPEAN BODY 29 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 6(3): 13–32.  
Hunt, A. (2003) Risk and moralization in everyday life. In Ericson, R. and Doyle, A. 
(eds.) Morality and Risk. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 165–192. 
Jarkovská, L. (2020) The European Union as a child molester: Sex education on pro-
Russian websites. Sex Education: Sexuality, Society and Learning, 20(2): 138–
153. https://doi.org/10.1080/14681811.2019.1634041 
Jasiewicz, K. (2009) ‘The past is never dead’: Identity, class, and voting behavior in 
contemporary Poland. East European Politics and Societies and Cultures, 23(4): 
491–508. https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325409342114 
Jedlicki, J. (1999a) Historical memory as a source of conflicts in Eastern Europe. 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 32(3): 225–232. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0967-067X(99)00010-0 
Jedlicki, J. (1999b) A Suburb of Europe. Nineteenth-century Polish approaches to 
Western Civilization. Budapest: Central European University Press. 
Kajta, J. (2017) Discursive strategies of Polish nationalists in the construction of the 
Other: The case of Muslims and homosexuals. Intersections: East European 
Journal of Society and Politics, 3(3): 88–107. 
https://doi.org/10.17356/ieejsp.v3i3.343 
Keinz, A. and Lewicki, P. (2019) Who embodies Europe? Explorations into the 
construction of European bodies. Anthropological Journal of European 
Cultures, 28(1): 7–24. https://doi.org/10.3167/ajec.2019.280104 
Koczanowicz, L. (2011) Post-postkomunizm a wojny kulturowe (Post-post-
communism and cultural wars). In Nycz, R. (ed.) Kultura po przejściach, 
osoby z przeszłościa˛. Polski dyskurs postzależnościowy: konteksty i 
perspektywy badawcze. Kraków: Universitas. 15–29. 
Korolczuk, E. and Graff, A. (2018): Gender as ‘ebola from Brussels’: The 
Anticolonial frame and the rise of illiberal populism. Signs, 43(4): 797–821. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/696691 
Kulpa, R. (2011) Nations and sexualities: ‘West’ and ‘East’’. In Kulpa, R. and 
Mizielińska, J. (eds.) De-centralizing Western Sexualities: Central and Eastern 
European Perspectives. Farnham: Ashgate. 43–62. 
Kulpa, R. (2014) Western leveraged pedagogy of Central and Eastern Europe: 
Discourses of homophobia, tolerance, and nationhood. Gender, Place and 
Culture, 21(4): 431–448. https://doi.org/10.1080/0966369X.2013.793656 
Kuus, M. (2004) Europe’s eastern expansion and the reinscription of otherness in 
East-Central Europe. Progress in Human Geography, 28(4): 472–489. 
https://doi.org/10.1191/0309132504ph498oa 
Kuus, M. (2007) Geopolitics Reframed: Security and Identity in Europe’s Eastern 
Enlargement. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Laclau, E. (1990) New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time. London: Verso. 
30  RANDI GRESSGÅRD AND RAFAŁ SMOCZYNSKI 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 6(3): 13–32.  
Laclau, E. (1996) Emancipation(s). London: Verso. 
Laclau, E. (2005) On Populist Reason. London: Verso. 
Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics. London: Verso. 
Lewicki, P. (2016) European bodies? Class and gender dynamics among EU civil 
servants in Brussels. Anthropological Journal of European Cultures, 25(2): 
116–138. https://doi.org/10.3167/ajec.2016.250206 
Marchart, O. (2007) Post-foundational Political Thought. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press. 
McClintock, A. (1995) Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial 
Context. New York: Routledge. 
Melegh, A. (2006) On the East-West Slope: Globalization, Narration, Racism and 
Discourses on Central and Eastern Europe. Budapest: CEU Press. 
Mizielińska, J. (2011) Travelling ideas, travelling times: On the temporalities of 
LGBT and queer politics in Poland and the ‘West’. In Kulpa, R. and 
Mizielińska, J. (eds.) De-centralizing Western Sexualities: Central and Eastern 
European Perspectives. Farnham: Ashgate. 85–105. 
Mosse, G.L. (1985) Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and Abnormal 
Sexuality in Modern Europe. New York: H. Fertig. 
Mouffe, C. (2005) On the Political. London: Verso.  
Nagel, J. (2003) Race, Ethnicity and Sexuality: Intimate Intersections, Forbidden 
Frontiers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Nabers, D. (2017) Crisis as dislocation in global politics. Politics, 37(4): 418–431. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395716661341 
Nölke, A. and Vliegenthart, A. (2009) Enlarging the varieties of Capitalism: The 
emergence of dependent market economies in East Central Europe. World 
Politics, 61(4): 670–702. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887109990098 
O’Dwyer, C. and Schwartz, K. Z. S. (2010) Minority rights after EU enlargement: A 
comparison of antigay politics in Poland and Latvia. Comparative European 
Politics, 8(2): 220–243. https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2008.31 
O’Malley, P. (1996) Risk and responsibility. In Barry, A., Osborne, T. and Rose, N. 
(eds.) Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism, and 
Rationalities of Government. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 189–208. 
Parker, A., Russo, M., Sommer, D. and Yaeger, P. (1992) (eds.) Nationalisms & 
Sexualities. New York: Routledge. 
Pryke, S. (1998) Nationalism and sexuality: What are the issues? Nations and 
Nationalism, 4(4): 529–546. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1354-5078.1998.00529.x 
NOBLE POLISH SEXUALITY AND THE CORRUPTED EUROPEAN BODY 31 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 6(3): 13–32.  
Rubin, G. (1984) Thinking sex: Notes for a radical theory of the politics of 
sexuality. In Vance, C. S. (ed.) Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female 
Sexuality. Boston: Kegan Paul. 267–319.  
Schinkel, W. (2009) The moralisation of citizenship in Dutch integration discourse. 
Amsterdam Law Forum. Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1480117 
Accessed 07-06-2020. 
Sremac, S. and Ganzevoort, R. R. (2015) Introduction: The interplay of religious and 
sexual nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe. In Sremac, S. and 
Ganzevoort, R. R. (eds.) Religious and Sexual Nationalisms in Central and 
Eastern Europe: Gods, Gays and Governments. Leiden: Brill. 1–14. 
Smoczynski, R. and Zarycki, T. (2017) Totem inteligencki. Arystokracja, szlachta i 
ziemiaństwo w polskiej przestrzeni społecznej (Intellectual Totem: Aristocracy, 
Nobility and Landed Gentry in Polish Social Space). Warszawa: Scholar. 
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